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Abstract
The British party system is known for its discipline and cohe-
sion, but it remains wedged on one issue: European integration. This
was observed both in the days of the EEC in the 1970s and the EU-
Maastricht treaty in the 1990s; This work aims to investigate whether
this holds true in the Brexit era. We utilise social network analy-
sis to unpack the patterns of dissent and rebellion among pairs of
MPs. Using data from Hansard, we compute similarity scores between
pairs of MPs from June 2017 until April 2019 and visualise them in a
force-directed network. Comparing Brexit- and non-Brexit divisions,
we analyse whether patterns of voting similarity and polarity differ
among pairs of MPs. Our results show that Brexit causes a wedge in
party politics, consistent to what is observed in history.
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The British party system is arguably one of the most successful in the world,
and many scholars consider the party discipline in the House of Commons as
a model that many Governments should follow. Throughout its contemporary
history, the strong party values and ideologies that define its two main parties
—Labour and Conservative—has lent credibility to the Parliamentary process,
setting the landscape for the effective implementation of policies in the British
government.
It is notable, however, that the cohesion and unity in the modern British party
system is persistently wedged by one issue, which is that of European integration.
It has come in various shapes and forms through the years. In the 1960s, as the
European Union (EU) began to form, parties, and their members, were divided
over whether the United Kingdom (UK) should join. Then, the early 1970s saw
the rise of a eurosceptic —or anti-integration—rhetoric as it became increasingly
apparent that the UK’s membership in the European Economic Commission (EEC)
was coming to fruition. The British party system was so fundamentally fragmented
that in 1975, the House of Commons decided to put the UK’s EEC membership
to a referendum. At the time, the public vote was decisive: 67% of voters chose
to continue its membership with the EEC. In the 1990s, euroscepticism reached
new heights when then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher retracted her support
for the European Union and questioned the priorities and direction of the EU
moving forward. In her famous 1988 Bruges speech, she was critical about the
proposal for a unified currency and warned against European socialism, causing
much fragmentation in her Conservative party which eventually led to her ouster.
The eurosceptic sentiment continues to linger to the present day, and there
is no clearer evidence than the results of the June 2016 referendum, which asked
whether the UK should Leave or Remain as a member of European Union. This
time, the results were a reversal of the outcome in 1975, as 51.9% of the electorate
voted to Leave the EU. Now we enter an era more commonly known as ”Brexit” (a
portmanteau for the words Britain and Exit), and similar to preceding concerns on
European integration, it is met with much skepticism and factionalisation among
the Members of Parliament. To this day, MPs could not agree on a Brexit deal,
while some MPs have gone as far as pushing for a second referendum.
Historical accounts have shown that the simplest expression of non-conformity
by an MP is to cast a ”rebellious” vote, or to vote against their party whip. In
a chamber of 650 MPs, individual votes are largely invisible. But by expressing
dissent and by defying party lines, MP rebels are given a voice and are empow-
ered to influence other MPs to question policy and be critical. Thus, rebels and
dissenters are given much attention particularly in instances when critical mass
needs to be gathered in order to pass legislation, such as a Brexit deal. There are
two questions that this research seeks to answer:
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• RQ1: Is Brexit a challenge to the cohesion and solidarity in the British party
system, consistent with the literature on legislative rebellion in the British
parliament on European integration issues?
• RQ2: Can Social Network Analysis help us understand individual social
dynamics in Parliament?
To answer the first research question, we begin by citing evidence supporting
the notion that the British party system is a disciplined one and that MPs vote
according to party lines. Then, we ask whether Brexit is an exception to this norm,
by aiming to show evidence of dissent and rebellion among MPs. We present a
historical account of party cohesion in the British legislative, and explain the
reasons why scholars have a high regard for the party discipline in Parliament
compared to party systems in other countries. We then follow with a discourse
on legislative rebellions in contemporary British politics, from the post-war to the
present, with particular focus on euroscepticism.
The second question is exploratory. To the extent of the literature on voting
cohesion and dissent in Parliament, most empirical work rely on historical accounts
and/or statistical methods aggregated to the party level. But the voting process
is clearly a social one —because ultimately, the outcome of the matter depends
on the actions of individual MPs and how they interact with each other. Through
network analysis we seek to identify the rebels and understand their roles in the
Brexit process.
While generally, rebellion and dissent implies voting against the party whip,
in this paper we operationalise this concept in a slightly different way. We de-
fine rebellion and dissent among pairs of MPs as one of two forms: first, as a
cross-party alliance, where an MP defies his/her own party whip and votes in
coherence with another MP from a different party; and second, as a within-party
conflict, where two MPs belong to the same party but vote differently. Using these
definitions, the task, apart from establishing evidence of dissent and rebellion on
Brexit-related legislation, is to identify the rebels or MPs with comparably higher
levels of dissent.
Party discipline and Brexit in a historical con-
text
Party cohesion in the British legislative
Cohesion and discipline are the tenets of the British party system, and is well-
reflected throughout its history. Early accounts of reverence to the disciplined
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party system in the UK dates back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries (Beer, 1969), and by the 1950s, the British system was recognised as the
model of effective party discipline and parliamentary solidarity: Epstein (1956)
considered British parliamentary cohesion as a ”virtue,” a prototype to emulate for
other party systems that wish to reform (e.g., United States). He further noted that
the strong support of MPs to their party is a key element that empowers British
parties to effectively rally or enact programs following an election. Samuels (1969)
supported this by saying that party loyalty is ”the political cement of modern
British politics,” while Lazer (1969) regarded the British system as the ”epitome
of effective democratic government, in contrast to the instability of the French,
and the complexity and lack of partisan principle of the Americans.”
The early literature consistently mentions three reasons for the effective party
discipline in the British parliament.
1. Structure, where the nature of the British constitution allows for a notable
union between the executive and the legislative branches (Epstein, 1956;
Samuels, 1969).
2. Centralisation of political parties (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Beer, 1969),
whereby homogeneity of interests and the orientation to national issues con-
tribute to institutionalised norms of behaviour.
3. Strong partisan values and ideologies (Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Searing,
1978; Jackson, 1968) contribute to the sharp distinctions across parties.
With the growing narrative on the strong party system in the British parlia-
ment, scholars shifted to a more quantitative approach on the subject, offering
methodological contributions and measurable evidences that aim to explain the
strong cohesion in political parties. Searing (1978) demonstrated strong within-
party cohesion alongside cross-party polarisation. He interviewed 438 MPs, then
employed a rank-order technique which discussed topics such as implicit values,
political motivations and behaviour and showed that within-party cohesion is high
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, thus indicating solidarity within their
respective political camps. Meanwhile, the Conservative and Labour parties were
found to be ”poles apart” and the difference in value comparisons showed strong
significance at the 0.001 level. In 1984, Collie proposed a cross country system-
atic review, on the observation that the analytical work on legislative studies had
shifted away from the ”institutional-historical” to the behavioural. She particu-
larly analysed collective and individual choices in legislative voting and found that
compared to American settings, legislatures in Western Europe including Britain
have consistently high levels of party cohesion, and thus most of the work on party
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behaviour have mostly focused on alignment rather than conflict. She further con-
cluded that party affiliation is the single largest determinant in voting decisions in
non-American legislature.
The observed cohesion in the British party system persists until today and is
evident in recent empirical work, though there is growing evidence of within-party
dissent in recent accounts (Collie, 1984; Cowley and Norton, 1999; Wood, 1982;
Whiteley and Seyd, 1999; Plumb, 2013). But in terms of discipline and party
cohesion in more recent years, Raymond and Worth (2017)’s regression analysis of
free votes —or unwhipped votes—on same-sex relations showed that MPs remain
loyal and identified to their parties, even when controlling for party rhetoric and
shared preferences. This is consistent with the finding by Pattie et al. (1998), which
showed that in free vote situations, the instinct of MPs is still to vote with their
partymates, and concluded that party remains as the most powerful predictor
of voting behaviour. Similarly, Norton (2003) and Russell (2014) demonstrated
party unity and cohesion in a discipline-free environment, by studying the House
of Lords, which is unique in its independence from the party whip. Norton used
a standard measure in the literature —the Rice score of cohesion (Tzelgov, 2014;
Garner and Letki, 2005; Sieberer, 2006; Rice, 1938)—and found ”extraordinarily
high” levels of cohesion among each of the three largest parties: the Conservatives,
the Labour, and Liberal Democrats, and that the level of dissent is not any higher
than what is observed in the House of Commons.
Compared to other countries, the contemporary British party system remains
to be a paragon of cohesion. In a cross-country comparison of 11 parliamentary
democracies around the decade 1990-2000, Sieberer (2006) used the Rice cohesion
index to capture party solidarity, by calculating the frequency of dissenting be-
haviour in a party relative to the size of the dissenting bloc. He found that unity
is very high across all countries surveyed, with the UK and Denmark achieving
the highest unity scores, where out of 100 possible points, each scored above 99.
While the literature on British political solidarity remained considerably con-
sistent through the years, several scholars note that the reasons that underpin
these strong party lines are different from what was observed a few decades ago.
For instance, Whiteley and Seyd (1999), and Norton (1980) observed the shift
away from a centralised view towards localism, in contrast to studies from more
than half-a-century ago that suggest that political centralisation is a fundamental
component in party cohesion (Beer, 1969; Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969). Iron-
ically, this pro-local sentiment was borne out of the centrism movement in the
past, and that the ensuing neglect and devaluation of local parties led to resent-
ment for the national (Whiteley and Seyd, 1999). And while in the early literature,
there was great emphasis on the impact of ideologies and values on party cohesion
(Epstein, 1956; Samuels, 1969; Searing, 1978), more recent studies emphasise the
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value of social interactions on voting behaviour. Norton (2003), Hazan (2003),
and Russell (2014) mention the impact of prior socialisation —or attributes that
are extra-parliamentary and learned by individuals outside of their exposure in the
parliament. For instance, shared backgrounds, common past experiences, or other
social interactions may manifest in voting behaviours. And when social interac-
tion is linked to economic incentives such as rational choice, understanding the
rationale behind party cohesion in today’s British politics becomes more complex.
Rebellion and euroscepticism in the British legislative
Although the general observation in the Parliament is one of party solidarity,
Collie (1984) noted that there have been varied and increasing accounts of within-
party dissent in contemporary British politics. Members of Parliament who are
dissatisfied with their political party can express their dissent by voting against
their party whip, and the MPs who frequently do so are considered rebels.
Notably, much of the literature surrounding party dissent and MP rebellion is
linked to the issue of European integration (Moore, 2018; Wood, 1982; Tzelgov,
2014; Forster, 2002; Baker et al., 1999; Whiteley and Seyd, 1999), to the extent
that it had earned its own term, euroscepticism. There are two pivotal points in
modern British political history where MPs were particularly wedged on the EU
rhetoric: first when the UK joined the European Economic Community or EEC,
a move which proved controversial that a referendum was called in 1975 to decide
whether Britain should continue its membership; and second, in the 1990s when
the Treaty on European Union, or Maastricht treaty, proposed to expand the EU’s
power, thus leading to the creation of a unified regional currency —now known as
the Euro—of which the British opted out of.
Britain and post-war party rebellions
The history of dissent and within-party rebellion amongst MPs dates back to the
post-war era. Jackson (1968)’s study of rebels and whips concluded that there
were normally more rebellions in the parties when they are in office, rather than
when they form the opposition. For instance, he found that in the years where the
Labour party was in government (1945-51), there were no significant Conservative
rebellions, but a significant number of Labour rebellions. Meanwhile, when the
Labour party was in opposition (1955-59), they encountered the same problems as
the previous years they were in power, but had very few revolts; the Conservative
party, on the other hand, had notable increases in within-party dissent alongside
its growing dominance in Parliament.
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Britain and the European Economic Community
In the years that followed, divisiveness and within-party dissent amongst MPs
mostly focused on the issue of European integration, beginning in the 1960s when
the Conservative party successfully managed their own party dissent alongside
Labour rebellion in the 1970s to negotiate the UK’s membership into the Common
Market (Baker et al., 1999). However, the issue of European integration in the
1960-70s received very little academic attention until later years, most notably
when Ashford (1980) concluded that the issue of Britain’s European integration
is the result of a ”managed coalition” rather than a ”stable hierarchy,” and when
Wood (1982) found that EU integration is ”the only issue that has internally
divided both left and right, and consistently over time.”
In his factor analysis, Wood studied roll-call voting in the British and French
parliaments in the years 1976-1978, particularly on European issues, where he clus-
tered the divisions in the House of Commons, then assigned positive and negative
weights to each yes and no vote, adjusted by the number of participants in the
division. He concluded that issues surrounding direct elections to the European
parliament cause much internal division among the left and the right MPs in both
Britain and France. Meanwhile, in his analysis of euroscepticism in contempo-
rary British politics, Forster (2002) found that between 1970-1972, Conservative
rebels were successful in ”establishing a crack, though not yet a split” in the unity
of their party as regards the European issue. In addition, majority of Labour
party was fundamentally fragmented: one-third voted against the Common Mar-
ket, one-third voted for the Common Market, and one-third abstained. The failure
of the opposition MPs to put a united stance thus forced the government to build
Britain’s EEC membership on weak foundations.
Britain and the Maastricht treaty
As European integration deepened in the 1980s, threats to Britain’s solid party
lines began to surface, but it was the ”lethal combination” of the weak majority
in Parliament that backed Britain’s EU membership, and the opposition’s newly-
formed political discipline that led to the steady rise of dissent in government
leadership particularly on the issues of European integration (Baker et al., 1999).
The eurosceptic sentiment elevated to new heights in the 1990s, with the negoti-
ation of the Maastricht treaty. The influence of former Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher, who originally supported Britain’s membership to the EEC in 1973, no-
tably opposed the idea of further EU integration in the final years of her leadership
in the late 1980s, which led to a rise in dissenting behaviour and euroscepticism
in the Conservative party. By the time that John Major had succeeded Margaret
Thatcher as the Prime Minister of Britain in 1990, the Conservative party had
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been left ”traumatised and deeply factionalised” as the issue of European inte-
gration was heavily used as a weapon in the campaigns of the party’s leadership
contenders (Forster, 2002). Ultimately, the factions that emerged and the Maas-
tricht rebellion that ensued left an indelible mark on John Major’s leadership, that
though his government was successful in passing the Maastricht bill to a slim ma-
jority in 1993, the issue of European integration had proved too divisive, forcing
him to resign as leader of the Conservative Party in 1995.
Cowley and Norton (1999)’s empirical analysis of rebellions in the British Par-
liament since 1945, showed that the level of dissent by government MPs around the
time of the Maastricht treaty was second only to the level of dissent around the pe-
riod of the EEC. Particularly, their detailed analysis of the divisions in 1992-1997
showed clear evidence that rebellions linked to the Maastricht treaty had far more
greater participants than non-Maastricht treaty issues. This led them to conclude
that the Maastricht rebellions could easily unseat the EEC rebellions of the 1970s
as the ”most persistent Conservative intra-party dissent in post-war history”.
While most studies of euroscepticism utilise qualitative analysis or empirical
analyses of surveys, Tzelgov (2014) studied the context and rhetoric surrounding
European integration in the 1990s. First, he demonstrated using Rice cohesion
scores that both Labour and Conservative parties faced low cohesion on issues of
European integration, but very highly cohesive on others, consistent to what was
observed by Cowley and Norton (1999). He then performed a text analysis of
party rhetoric, and showed differences in the topical usage between eurosceptics
and europhiles, and between the Labour and Conservative parties: eurosceptics
are more likely to use a nationalistic narrative, while the Labour party is more
likely to pivot towards social issues.
Brexit
For many years, eurosceptics have long campaigned for a vote on whether the UK
should renegotiate its terms with the EU. David Cameron, Britain’s Prime Minister
in 2010, promised to put forward a referendum on the UK’s EU membership should
he be reelected. On his reelection, he fulfilled his promise of a vote, and despite
his’ and the Conservative party’s campaign to Remain, on June 23, 2016, 51.9%
of the voting public voted in favour of leaving the European Union, while 48.1%
voted to remain (Electoral Commission, 2016).
Because Brexit is an ongoing saga and key events in the House of Commons
have yet to unfold, most of the academic literature surrounding Brexit focus on
party-affiliated public opinion rather than MP voting dynamics. Many studies
on public voting behaviour related to Brexit show strong polarisation. Motivated
by the voter outcome on the Brexit referendum, Surridge (2018) analysed data
8
from the British Election studies, from 1992 to 2017, and found that the left-
right ideological distance between Conservatives and Labour was on a declining
trend from 1992 until 2005, but the gap reopened in 2010, and now, in 2017,
the ideological split is back on its highest level since 1992. Meanwhile, Stokes
(2016) conducted a survey of 10,491 respondents from 10 EU countries in 2016
on their views on euroscepticism post-Brexit referendum. In his analysis he found
that the UK had the largest ideological split on EU matters. Similarly, on the
question on whether some powers should be returned to national governments,
the ideological split of UK left-leaning and right-leaning respondents were the
highest, and significantly higher than the rest of the 9 countries sampled. Also,
Vasilopoulou (2016) performed a multivariate statistical analysis of Brexit support
by the public, and found that left-right ideologies were a good indicator of Brexit
support, but not a particular party affiliation.
Lynch and Whitaker (2018) studied the extent to which Brexit drove changes
within the Conservative party, analysing how each of 330 Conservative MP’s voted
in the referendum in relation to their previous eurosceptic positions. Using regres-
sion analyses, they found that the more rebellious a Conservative MP was in 2010
to 2016, the more likely he/she is to be a Hard Brexiteer, or to vote Leave in the
2016 referendum. Meanwhile, they also found that the Conservative party’s Re-
main campaign was supported by a number of ”reluctant Remainers” —euroscep-
tics or soft Brexiteers whose decision to vote Remain had been difficult. Hence,
the referendum’s Leave outcome became an opportunity for the Hard Brexiteers
and the ”reluctant Remainers” to come together. In a similar study, Moore (2018)
tried to understand the motivations behind the dissent among Conservative MPs
in the 2016 referendum. He found that policy-seeking behaviour, loosely linked to
an MP’s eurosceptic position, had a strong statistical influence on a Leave endorse-
ment. Office-seeking motivations also were found to be influential in the voting
decision, where frontbenchers were more likely to be loyal to the Prime Minister
and vote Remain, while seasoned backbenchers were more likely to defy and vote
Leave. Finally, in terms of vote-seeking, he found evidence that a constituency’s
eurosceptic position may influence a Conservative MP to cast a rebellious vote.
The academic work on party cohesion in the British legislative is extensive and
varied, however we find that two important gaps need to be addressed. First, is the
gap in the timeline. Research on party cohesion is disproportionately heavy in the
earlier days, while not much is written in reference to the Brexit era. The second
gap in the literature is that the work on individual choice is limited. The literature
mentions that contemporary British politics has notably moved from centralism
(or the national) towards localism (or the individual constituencies), and that MPs
put greater emphasis on social interactions than in the past. It is also noted that
ideological splits, rather than party affiliation, may better explain current voting
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dynamics. Hence, while aggregate tools of party solidarity remain relevant, it is
also important to complement these tools with methods that consider the shifting
behaviour and incentives of individual MPs.
Data and Methods
Data
For this work, we utilise data from Hansard, the official central repository of all
UK Parliamentary records. Hansard provides comprehensive and verbatim infor-
mation on Parliament debates, divisions, petitions, and statements, for both the
House of Commons and the House of Lords. The digitalised database of division
voting started in March 2016, and is made available for download through the
data.parliament.uk website. We begin the analysis with a dataset of divisions in
the House of Commons for only the 57th Parliament, which is the legislature im-
mediately following the Brexit referendum and the consequent General Election on
8 June 2017. It began on 21st June, 2017 until until 10th April, two months before
Theresa May including a total of 414 divisions. Committee divisions, which tackle
particular areas of interest, were excluded from the analysis. The list of divisions
is taken from http://explore.data.parliament.uk/, where each division in the
House of Commons is recorded in a CSV file, tagged with a unique ID, a unique
URL which contains detailed information (such as the voting record), and the title
of the divisions.
From this list of divisions, we identify the 414 that belong to the 57th Parlia-
ment. As this analysis primarily seeks to compare MP voting patterns between
Brexit and non-Brexit divisions, each of the 414 need to be classified and grouped
accordingly. Thus, inferring from the titles of each division, we manually label and
classify them as Brexit or non-Brexit. For instance, any division that mentions the
words: EU exit, EU withdrawal, Brexit, and other related keywords in their title
were tagged as Brexit divisions. In total, out of the 414, there were 192 divisions
classifed as Brexit and 222 non-Brexit. Then, to gather the names of every MPs
who voted ”Aye” or ”No” on each of the 414 divisions, we built a web crawler that
would access the unique URLs provided for each of the 414 divisions, then parse
the information on the voting results.
MPs either belong to a political party or are Independent. For this study, the
breakdown of 650 MPs by political party are: 317 from the Conservative Party, 254
from the Labour Party, 35 from SNP or the Scottish National Party, 11 from the
Liberal Democrats, 10 from the DUP or Democratic Unionist Party (of Northern
Ireland), 7 from Sinn Fe´in, 4 from Plaid Cymru (or the Party of Wales), 1 from
the Green Party, and 11 Independent. Out of the 650, two from the Conservative
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and two from the Labour party do not vote as the Speaker and 3 Deputy Speakers
of the House, while the 7 Sinn Fe´in are absentionists and do not take their seats in
the House of Commons; hence there are 639 voting MPs. Because Hansard only
records the MPs who voted ”Ayes” or ”Noes,” MPs that were missing from either
were presumed to not have voted on the division. This is the main dataset that
we use for the analysis.
Each of the political parties classify themselves on an ideological spectrum
from left to right. Traditionally, the two largest parties, Labour and Conservative,
are on the left and the right, respectively. The DUP, which entered into a coalition
with the Conservative Party in 2017, is also on the Right-wing; while the other
Opposition parties are on the Left-wing. The political party breakdown of the 639
voting MPs is provided in Table 1. We also note where each political party lies on
the political spectrum. For each of the 11 Independent MPs who, by definition is
not affiliated (and not to be confused with the UKIP, or UK Independence Party),
we labelled their ideology by their prior political affiliation: one Independent MP
was formerly from the Conservative Party, while 8 were formerly Labour, and one
was a former Liberal Democrat.
There is one Independent candidate who was formerly from a lesser-known
Northern Ireland party —the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)—and classifying this
required further scrutiny. The UUP identifies itself with the Conservative Party,
which warrants a Right-wing label, however the MP, Lady Hermon, has in fact
quit the UUP for her refusal to support the Conservatives (BBC, 2010). This
being the case, we classified Lady Hermon as Left-wing.
Political Party N
Left or
Right-wing
Conservative 315 Right
Labour 252 Left
Scottish National Party 35 Left
Independent 11 10 Left, 1 Right
Liberal Democrat 11 Left
Democratic Unionist Party 10 Right
Plaid Cymru 4 Left
Green Party 1 Left
Total 639
Table 1: Overview of the MPs under study and their party affiliations.
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Methods
Voting counts
We organise the data into a 639 × 414 matrix, refer to Figure 1 below. On the
rows are each of the 639 voting MPs, and on the columns are each of the 414
divisions. The elements of the matrix are: +1, if the member voted ”Aye” on the
division, −1 if the member voted ”No”, and 0 if the MP did not vote.
Figure 1: A sample of the MPs’ divisions, and their vote matrix. The full
matrix size is 639 × 414.
The next step is to sub-divide the matrix into the Brexit and the non-Brexit
divisions. As mentioned earlier, these were classified manually according to the
mention of EU exit, withdrawal, or related words in their division title. Splitting
the big matrix results in two smaller matrices with sizes 639 × 192 containing
the Brexit divisions, and 639 × 222 containing the non-Brexit divisions. We then
transform each of these two smaller matrices into a similarity matrix, where the
elements of each matrix refer to the number of instances that that two MPs voted
similarly minus the number of times that they voted dissimilar to each other. In
matrix form, this is defined as the sum product of the matrix A multiplied its
transpose:
A×AT =
n∑
i,j=1
aijbij
where A = {a11, a12, a13, ..., ann}, and n =
{
192, if Brexit
222, non-Brexit
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By this definition, both the Brexit and the non-Brexit case will have a resulting
square matrix with dimension 639 × 639, with names of MPs on both the rows and
the columns, and elements of each matrix indicate voting similarities amongst pairs
of MPs: a high positive number indicates that the pair voted similarly together;
while a large negative value suggests voting polarity. The square matrix is naturally
symmetric along the main diagonal. Figure 2 provides a visual representation for
the Brexit case.
Figure 2: A sample of the similarity matrix for each MP pair (Brexit case).
The full matrix size is 639 × 639.
Cosine similarity
It can be observed that the similarity matrix in Figure 2 treats some votes (e.g.,
−1,0,+1) equally, even if an MP did not vote on a division, and analysing it
this way could be misleading: for instance, a score of +100 in Figure 2 could
either be the sum of two MPs voting similarly minus the instances that they
voted dissimilarly (i.e., 130 − 30 = 100), but it could also be the case that one
MP had only voted on 100 divisions, abstained on the rest, and voted similarly
100% of the time with another MP (i.e., 100 − 0 = 100). Arguably, the voting
similarity of the latter case is stronger than the former. Hence, the similarity score
must be weighted by the frequency of votes cast by each MP for the study period.
Empirically, this means that MPs have varying vector densities depending on their
voting frequency, which is a reasonable assumption to make considering that the
main diagonal of the matrix in Figure 2 are not equal. The cosine similarity
formula, which projects a pair of vectors in multidimensional space, can measure
the similarity of each pair of MPs, controlling for the differences in the number of
non-zero elements in the vectors:
13
a · b
‖a‖‖b‖ =
n∑
i=1
aibi√
n∑
i=1
a2i
√
n∑
i=1
b2i
where ai and bi are vectors of votes for division i for a pair of MPs a and b,
and n =
{
192, if Brexit
222, non-Brexit
Each vector pair (i.e., pair of MPs) is given a cosine similarity score between
−1 (full dissimilarity) and +1 (full similarity). A value of 0 means no correlation.
Refer to Figure 3 for the cosine similarity transformation of the Brexit case.
Figure 3: A sample of cosine similarity matrix for the Brexit case. The full
matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values of this matrix range from −1 (full
dissimilarity) to +1 (full similarity).
Party similarity
Recall that we define rebellion by voting coherence of MPs belonging to different
parties (cross-party alliance) or voting polarities of MPs belonging to the same
party (within-party conflict). The cosine similarity matrix only establishes the
voting coherence or voting polarity, but does not indicate anything on the party
similarities between pairs of MPs. Hence, we define a reference party similarity
matrix and compare the cosine similarity matrix to it. Consider a 639 × 639
matrix with entries of +1, if the MP pair belongs to the same political party; or
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−1, if the MP pair does not belong to the same party. Note that there are 8 parties
(excluding Sinn Fe´in) in the analysis: Conservative, Labour, Liberal Democrats,
DUP, SNP, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, and Independent; though this matrix could
also be prepared for a two-ideology case (Left-wing and Right-wing). The party
similarity matrix is the same for the Brexit, and the non-Brexit case. Refer to
Figure 4 for a visualisation of the 8 party case.
Figure 4: A sample of the party similarity matrix (identical for both the
Brexit and non-Brexit case). The full matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values
of this matrix are either −1 (party dissimilarity) or +1 (party similarity).
Party-adjusted voting similarity matrix
Finally, we compare the cosine similarity matrix with the party similarity matrix
by subtracting the latter from the former for both Brexit and non-Brexit divisions.
The final result are two 639 × 639 matrices (see Figure 5). The elements of either
matrix have a range of values from −2 to +2, centred on zero. These values
indicate the magnitude by which the voting similarity between a pair of MPs is
explained by their party. For instance, a value that is equal to zero means that
the voting similarity between MPs is fully explained by their party similarity. As
values move further away from zero, this means that the party affiliations have
less power in explaining the voting similarity/dissimilarity among pairs of MPs.
Thus, the non-zero values in the matrix imply varying deviations from voting
patterns expected by the party affiliations. Values that are near-zero, for instance,
mean that voting (dis)similarity is —for the most part—explained by the party
(dis)similarity. Of interest to this study are the cases where the MPs’ voting
(dis)similarity is not explained by their party affiliations. These are the values
that in Figure 5 deviate the farthest away from zero, towards the end of the range
[−2, +2]. Values close to −2 is an indication of a within-party conflict, or a
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pair of MPs that voted dissimilarly despite belonging to the same party, while
values close to +2 is an indication of a cross-party alliance, or a pair of MPs
that voted cohesively despite belonging to different parties.
Figure 5: A sample of the final adjusted voting similarity score matrix (Brexit
case). The full matrix size is 639 × 639, and the values of this matrix range
from −2 (within party conflicts) to +2 (cross-party alliances).
Network representation
Finally, the result in Figure 5 is a square matrix with a zero main diagonal and
symmetric entries, which is equivalent to the adjacency matrix of an undirected
graph. The row and column labels (which are the names of the MPs) are the nodes
of the network, while the elements of the matrix are the edges —they refer to the
party-adjusted voting similarity or dissimilarity of each pair of nodes (or pair of
MPs). One can then visualise the adjacency matrix shown in Figure 5 to a network,
where each node represents an MP, and the elements of the adjacency matrix
suggests the relationship between node pairs: strong negative values indicate polar
opposites (or within-party conflict), while strong positive values mean cohesion (or
cross-party alliance).
The algorithm used in this thesis is Jacomy et al. (2014)’s ForceAtlas2 layout
and is implemented through the software Gephi. The basic idea of the algorithm is
similar to a magnetic force wherein nodes that are polar opposites represent repul-
sion, while cohesive nodes represent attraction. Hence, if a pair of MPs correspond
to a high negative score (within-party conflict) in the adjacency matrix, the force-
directed algorithm will pull them far apart in the network space. Meanwhile, a
pair of MPs that correspond to a high positive score (cross-party alliance) in the
adjacency matrix are expected to be pushed closer together. See Supplementary
Material for more details.
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Results and Discussion
Party-adjusted voting similarity matrices
In Figure 6, we show a histogram of the elements of the matrix from the party-
adjusted voting similarity matrix for each of the Brexit and the non-Brexit cases.
Figure 6: Histogram of similarity scores. Left: the party-adjusted (8 political
parties) and right: the ideology-adjusted (Left- and Right-wing), voting simi-
larity matrix for the Brexit (Blue) and non-Brexit (Orange) divisions. Values
that lie on either ends of the dotted line represent connections between dis-
senting MPs: ≤ −1 are within-party conflicts, while ≥ 1 are cross-party
alliances.
The two types of dissent are presented in the histogram as follows. Values that
are greater than or equal to 1 are cross-party alliances, or two MPs that belong
to different parties but voted cohesively. On the other extreme, values that are less
than or equal to −1 signal within-party conflicts, or two MPs that belong to
the same party but voted opposite. There are two things that can be inferred from
Figure 6: first, there are comparatively higher levels of cross-party alliances than
within-party conflicts; second, and more importantly, it can be observed that there
is a larger frequency of within-party conflicts on Brexit-related divisions compared
to non-Brexit, which is in line with the literature on party rebellion particularly
on issues of European integration.
Network projection
We visualise the extreme values, i.e. ≥ 1 (cross-party alliances) and ≤ −1 (within-
party conflicts) in Figure 7. It can be observed that for the top graph, which
17
Figure 7: Network projection of dissent and rebellion for non-Brexit (top)
and Brexit (bottom) divisions, for the 8 political party case. Each node
denotes an MP, connected by an edge to another MP. The colour of the edge
represents whether the connection is a repulsive (pull) or attractive (push)
force. Node colours denote party affiliation.
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represents the non-Brexit divisions, there are two distinct clusters, one largely blue,
and the other is largely red; and the nodes that reside in each cluster are connected
by dense green edges. Meanwhile, there are very few cross-cluster connections
(mostly related to Liberal Democrat MPs).
The the non-Brexit graph suggests strong party discipline within each of the
two main parties, Conservative and Labour. Conservative nodes tend to cluster
together, while Labour nodes (and other parties in opposition) are in the other
cluster. This means that for non-Brexit divisions, MPs vote largely within their
party lines, and very rarely do they rebel and cross to the other cluster. One can
also infer the cross-party alliances from the graph. For instance, the DUP and the
Conservative are clustered together, which verifies their voting coalition. Mean-
while, the Labour, Plaid Cymru, Green, and SNP, are on the other cluster, which
suggests a united opposition when voting in Parliament on non-Brexit divisions;
and Liberal Democrats split between the two camps.
This is a stark contrast to the Brexit divisions, the bottom graph of Figure
7. There is evidently greater cross-cluster interaction, which is an indication that
party lines are blurred. The red edges suggest within-party conflict. This means
that there are a number of MPs that rebel from the cluster discipline and are
pulled apart. For example, some nodes representing Labour MPs have moved
within the cluster space of the Conservative party, which indicates that these MPs
have voted more cohesively with the Conservative rhetoric, and thus expressing
strong repulsion to MPs from their own party. Also, cross-party alliances may
occur among pairs of ideologically polarised MPs; several nodes representing the
Conservative MPs are being pushed to the centre towards the Labour cluster.
These results are however largely influenced by the number of political parties
in the analysis. Mainly, the cross-party alliances occur almost exclusively within
the ideological cluster, and does not necessarily signify rebellion. In order to
distinguish the true rebellions from the effect of ideological cohesion from multiple
parties, we relabel the party similarity matrix to indicate ideological affiliation
(Left- or Right-wing) rather than the original 8-political party classification. The
analysis based on the 2-ideology case is also backed by recent studies that find
ideology as a determinant of Brexit support (Vasilopoulou, 2016; Surridge, 2018).
Ideology-adjusted voting similarity matrices
In Figure 6(right), we show the histogram of a two-ideology case, where Conserva-
tives and the DUP, plus one independent MP were classified as Right-wing; while
the rest of the MPs were classified as Left-wing. Re-labelling each MP by ide-
ology rather than by political party gives a clearer and more striking result. It
appears that the cross-party alliances and within-party conflicts in the non-Brexit
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case completely disappear when re-labelling the MPs by Left or Right. On the
other hand, the Brexit case continues to identify instances of rebellion on both
cross-party alliances and within-party conflicts. In Figure 8, we graph the extreme
values of the histogram in Figure 6(right), i.e. ≤ −1 (within-party conflicts), and
≥ 1 (cross-party alliances). It is evident that in the top graph that represents the
non-Brexit case, there is no rebellion. The absence of edges in the top graph of
Figure 8 means that each MP voted within expectation: they voted mostly within
their ideological rhetoric.
For the Brexit-related divisions, the re-labelling from 8 parties to 2 ideologies
gives us a clearer picture, and helps us understand the movement of the rebels and
dissenters more visibly, as seen in the bottom graph of Figure 8. We can clearly
identify that there are four dissenting MPs from the Left-wing who closely align
with the Right on Brexit-related issues. These rebels form cross-party alliances
with the Right-wing, which explains their position in the graph and the green edges
that link them to the Right-wing MPs. As a direct result, these Left-wing rebels
have a red edge to other members of the Left-wing, which represent differences
on Brexit-related ideologies. The same holds true for the Right-wing dissenters.
Their position in the graph may give an indication of their level of dissent: some
nodes are spatially clustered to the Left-wing, while some Right-wing MPs are
more ”on the fence” but are slowly being pushed to the Left.
The rebels
By visual inspection of Figure 8, we identify sixteen nodes that are located far
from their cluster. There are 16 rebels, five from the Right-wing and eleven from
the Left-wing. Interestingly, this is in contrast to the historical observation made
by Jackson (1968) on post-war rebels and whips, where he mentioned that the
ruling party is observed to have more rebellions than the opposition party, but
consistent with Forster (2002)’s study on euroscepticism in contemporary British
politics, where he noted that the factionalisation of the opposition and its failure
to capitalise on the weaknesses of the ruling party may result in a fundamentally
weak Government. Here, we analyse the role of each of these MPs in Brexit
debates which warrants their position as dissenters. In Figure 9(top), we replicate
the visualisation of the two-ideology network, however with greater emphasis on
the MPs that were identified as rebels.
Change UK
The network was able to pinpoint four MP dissenters who eventually formed the
breakaway party Change UK in February 2019, three months before Theresa May
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Figure 8: Network projection of dissent and rebellion for non-Brexit (top)
and Brexit divisions (bottom), for the 2 political ideology case. Each node
denotes an MP, connected by an edge to another MP. The colour of the edge
represents whether the connection is a repulsive (pull) or attractive (push)
force. Node colours denote ideological affiliation.
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Figure 9: Upper panel: The rebels as identified by the network projection.
The node colour represents ideological position: red for Left-wing; blue for
Right-wing. Lower panel: The identified rebels using visual inspection, and
rebellion score (highlighted in yellow).
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announced her resignation as Prime Minister. According to party member Chuka,
Change UK is a pro-EU party whose members had left the more established po-
litical parties ”to build an alternative to broken politics”; many members identify
with a centre-left or centre-right position (Umunna, 2019). At its peak, the party
had 11 members: 3 were former Conservative MPs and 8 were formerly Labour;
the network visualisation was able to identify all three conservative rebels, and
one labour rebel. Not surprisingly, Change UK leader Anna Soubry, the former
Conservative party MP could be seen at the opposite end of her original cluster,
alongside the cluster that is heavily dominated by the Left-wing ideology, which is
known for its pro-EU stance. Meanwhile, Heidi Allen and Sarah Wollaston, also
former Conservative MPs, are notably removed from their original Right-wing clus-
ter hovering towards the centre-Left. Luciana Berger, a Labour MP who joined
Change UK, has also noticeably broken away from the Left and spatially closer to
the other three Change UK members.
Father of the House
Kenneth Clarke is a Conservative MP whose position in the network can also
be found on the opposite end of his expected cluster alongside the Labour and
other Left-wing MPs. He is the ”Father of the House,” a title traditionally be-
stowed on the longest-serving MP, and has served five Conservative prime ministers
—Heath, Thatcher, Major, Cameron, and May—since the 1970s. Kenneth Clarke
is known for his ”extraordinary consistency” over Europe (Orchard, 2018). He has
always adamantly voted to remain in the EU, and has hinted that his steadfast
pro-European stance may have cost him his three failed campaigns to lead the
Conservative party. He is quoted as saying: ”I could not see the slightest point
in trying to become leader of the party —and one therefore hoped Prime Minis-
ter—on a platform which I didn’t actually agree with”, making him an admired
figure in Parliament particularly with the younger generation for his principled
bearing.
Labour troublemakers
Three Labour MPs identified by the network: Kate Hoey, Frank Field, and Graham
Stringer, are prominent hard-Brexit supporters, which justifies their node location
in the graph, which is embedded in the Right-wing cluster. The fourth rebel node
in the Right-wing cluster is pro-Brexit MP Kelvin Hopkins, currently Independent
but only because he was suspended from the Labour party. In 2018, they were
known to be the only four Labour MPs backing the Government’s Brexit agenda
(McDonald, 2018).
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Kate Hoey is arguably the most prominent Labour Brexiteer (Dickson, 2017)
and has been named as one of 40 Brexit troublemakers by Politico, a prominent
international political newspaper. Born in Northern Ireland, she has oftentimes
shown sympathy with the Right-wing DUP, and is known to defy the Labour whip
on a number of occasions (DeSmog UK, 2019). Frank Field is said to have made a
name for himself as an ”independent thinker” (Hanley, 2018) though his loyalty to
the Labour party has always been suspect. The MP’s views is known to have been
incompatible with the Labour’s values long before Brexit. As such, he was also
named by Politico as one of its 40 Brexit troublemakers (Dickson, 2017) for his
dissenting opinions with his own party membership. Similarly, Graham Stringer
is a known Brexiteer from the Labour party and along with Kate Hoey, he has
repeatedly called for the support of his partymates to the Brexit process, citing
”real peril” for the Labour party if they appear keen to stop it (Hoey and Stringer,
2019).
On the fence
I voted to remain, but the people voted to leave in 2016. My con-
stituency voted to leave by a margin of 55/45. We said we would
honour the outcome of the referendum, and so we must.
Sir Gary Streeter, 2019
Sir Gary Streeter’s curious position on the network straddles between the two
clusters, and his stance on Brexit reflects this. He is a Conservative MP that voted
to remain during the 2016 referendum, but his constituency voted to leave. As
opinion in his constituency remains ”deeply divided,” it appears from the network
analysis that so does he.
I’m in a leave constituency, but I would do what’s right.
MP David Hanson, 2019
Meanwhile, Labour MP David Hanson is in a similar conundrum. He voted
Remain, consistent with the current Labour party rhetoric, but his constituency
voted for Brexit. His place in the network reflects this position, which is removed
from the cluster but still largely aligned to the Left. He is known to have said
that ”I promised everyone in [my constituency] Delyn that I would never vote for
something that made them poorer... It is my job to try and navigate a way forward
that respects the wishes of 100% of constituents (Hanson, 2019).”
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MP Hanson’s place in the network (see Figure 9) is visibly shared with six other
Labour MPs: Ruth Jones, Sir David Crausby, Luciana Berger, Emma Reynolds,
Keith Vaz and Ian Austin. With the exception of Luciana Berger, which I noted
earlier is part of the Change UK movement, all the other five MPs, like David
Hanson, are pro-Remain Labour MPs but serve Leave-voting constituencies. Ruth
Jones’ constituency, Newport West, has long been a Labour stronghold, but voted
to Leave by a margin of 56-44 (Forrest, 2019). Similarly, Sir David Crausby of
Bolton Northeast, Emma Reynolds of Wolverhampton Northeast, and Keith Vaz
of Leicester East, all belong to constituencies that voted for Brexit. Ian Austin,
an Independent MP but formerly affiliated with the Labour party, can be seen as
further removed from the cluster but still largely ideologically aligned to the Left.
His constituency, Dudley North, also chose to Leave.
Rebellion scores
Finally, we define a rebellion score for each MP by taking the absolute value of
each element of the matrix in Figure 5 (only for the Brexit divisions) then taking
the sum of every row. The final vector will have a dimension of 639 × 1, where each
element represents an MP’s rebellion score, or the magnitude of an MP’s within-
party conflicts and cross-party alliances. Finally, rebellion scores were normalised
between zero and one. As a form of robustness, we compare the rebels identified
from the visual inspection with the rebels identified using the rebellion scores
metric. Table 2 shows the top 20 rebels by rebellion score. Generally, MPs were
found to have low rebellion scores: the mean rebellion score for all 639 MPs is
0.05, and the median is 0.03. But on the top of the list is Kate Hoey, the Labour
MP from Vauxhall who is also a Hard Brexit advocate; she was also identified as
a rebel in the network visualisation.
Aside from MP Kate Hoey, there are also notable overlaps between the MPs
with the highest rebellion score, and the rebel MPs identified using a visual inspec-
tion of the network. Of the 16 rebels identified by visual inspection, 10 of them
also have the highest rebellion scores. In Figure 9(lower panel), we plot all the
rebels identified by visual inspection and/or rebel score. From the visualisation,
it is evident that the high-scoring rebels belong to a sub-cluster that is slightly
detached from the main ideological cluster. A closer examination shows that these
high-scoring rebels support their party’s ideological rhetoric, but only to a certain
extent; In particular, these rebels were found to have similar thoughts on a no-deal
Brexit scenario. For example, the sub-cluster of Labour MPs on the left wing (e.g.
John Mann, Kevin Barron, Ronnie Campbell) were all part of a rebellion that
resulted in a failed bid by the opposition to block a no-deal Brexit in June 2019
(Mairs, 2019). Meanwhile, the rebels on the right-wing sub-cluster were all found
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MP Party Ideology Constituency
Rebel
score
Kate Hoey Labour Left Vauxhall 1.00
Frank Field Independent Left Birkenhead 0.96
Lady Hermon Independent Left North Down 0.89
Graham Stringer Labour Left Blackley & Broughton 0.81
Mr Kenneth Clarke Conservative Right Rushcliffe 0.64
Anna Soubry Conservative Right Broxtowe 0.59
Kelvin Hopkins Independent Left Luton North 0.51
Dr Sarah Wollaston Conservative Right Totnes 0.46
Heidi Allen Conservative Right South Cambridgeshire 0.41
Mr Ronnie Campbell Labour Left Blyth Valley 0.37
John Mann Labour Left Bassetlaw 0.33
Ian Austin Independent Left Dudley North 0.33
Mr Dominic Grieve Conservative Right Beaconsfield 0.31
Sir Gary Streeter Conservative Right South West Devon 0.28
Antoinette Sandbach Conservative Right Eddisbury 0.28
Sir Kevin Barron Labour Left Rother Valley 0.27
Dr Phillip Lee Conservative Right Bracknell 0.27
Guto Bebb Conservative Right Aberconwy 0.27
Justine Greening Conservative Right Putney 0.27
Mr Sam Gyimah Conservative Right East Surrey 0.26
Mean rebel score 0.05
Median rebel score 0.03
Number of MPs 639
Table 2: Top 20 rebels based on rebellion score.
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to be notably opposed to a no-deal Brexit. Particularly, 4 of the 5 MPs in this
sub-cluster were former ministers in the Theresa May cabinet who now are voting
against the Government.
Conclusion
In this study, we showed that Brexit is consistent with the other issues of European
integration in the past, in that it creates a wedge in Parliament. Addressing the
first research question, we reported that there is a strong disparity in MP voting
on Brexit divisions compared to non-Brexit. The network analysis showed that
while there are two distinct (ideology) clusters on both the Brexit and the non-
Brexit case, the inter-connectivities across these clusters differ significantly. In
non-Brexit divisions, it is almost certain that MPs follow the party rhetoric, and
defying the party whip is largely negligible. As demonstrated by the network
visualisation, most cross-party alliances happen within one cluster only and rarely
does it ever cross to the other side. Meanwhile, within-party conflicts are also very
minimal. On the other hand, in the Brexit divisions, there was a visible blurring
of the party line, and cross-cluster interaction is obvious and apparent. There
exists strong repulsion across various node pairs, and while in the non-Brexit case,
cross-party alliances only happen within a cluster, it is evident that in the Brexit
case, cross-party alliances could happen across two clusters that intuitively have
polarised ideological beliefs.
In relation to the second research question, we were able to focus on the results
at the node level which allows us to investigate the MP’s identified as rebels.
We found that these MPs were the subsequent members of the breakaway party
Change UK, a few notable MP ”troublemakers” and some MPs who were faced
with a moral decision to either support their party lines, or their people’s vote. To
summarise, the main findings of this study are:
1. Brexit, similar to past issues of European integration, is a challenge to the
cohesion and solidarity of the British party system.
2. Social network analysis helped us visually identify sixteen MP rebels, and
through further analysis, their positions in the network are justified by their
ideology.
European integration has long been a persistent wedge issue in the British
parliament. Throughout the contemporary history of the British political system,
from the 1960s until today, the topic of euroscepticism has remained a challenge
to the renowned party system in the UK. Our primary contribution is to connect
the literature on Eurosceptic rebellion to the present time, by demonstrating that
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Brexit-related dissent is similar to the Parliament’s past experiences with Euro-
pean integration. The study of dissent and rebellion is not a new concept, but
through social network analysis we aim to bring new perspectives. This alterna-
tive methodology is our second contribution to the literature. After all, the voting
process is a social phenomenon, and the understanding of rebellion in Parliament
goes beyond knowing whether dissent is high or if cohesion levels within parties
are low. Especially in today’s localism-focused politics, what adds value is our
understanding of the dynamics behind every MP’s vote, and to unlock patterns
that may offer clues on what happens next. When faced with uncertainty, learning
that there are splits and factions in the party system is already after-the-fact and
contributes very little in the action plan to move forward. But understanding the
interactions of individuals on a granularised (division) level can provide an ample
road map to overcome the challenges in the legislative process.
We can count few limitations in our approach. First, it is by no means causal.
While we can identify the rebels by visual inspection of their voting behaviour,
whether or not the MP will actually leave his/her party remains to be seen. In this
thesis we have presented an ex-post analysis of the rebels, but it is recommended
that the social network analysis is supplemented by other quantitative approaches
that specialise in causal inference. Second, by taking a granular approach, one
may overlook the benefits of using a simpler and uncomplicated measure of party
cohesion. For instance, traditional aggregated approaches may be easier to inter-
pret as it is computationally convenient and most information is condensed to a
single number (e.g. a party cohesion score), whereas in producing the network, or
a rebellion score for each MP may entail complex calculations and matrix trans-
formations that may be difficult to disentangle. In this analysis we tried to bridge
this complexity gap by producing visual representations of the network, but the
process of generating it may not necessarily be straightforward.
The main implication of this analysis is that the issue of European integration
continues to linger until the present, and that euroscepticism still casts a long
shadow in the House of Commons. If there are lessons to be learned from the past,
it is that dissent and rebellion bear large consequences, because the Government
must carry on despite it, and legislation will be passed on a minority and weak
foundation. Our immediate experience does not give us much credence, as tran-
sition governments following a period of fragmentation are likely to be just that
—a transition period. But on the other hand, given today’s empirical methods,
we no longer are limited to using past experiences as our benchmark of the future.
The record-keeping of the UK Parliament is one of the most modern, and com-
prehensive systems available for public sector data. The power of computing and
contemporary tools such as social network analysis allows us to uncover the massive
information that is available to us, and gives us a more informed understanding of
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our present.
Using the results of this social network analysis demonstrates that the Parlia-
ment, and policymakers, can better anticipate signals of rebellious behaviours, and
better identify the key influencers in the legislative process. As voting on House
divisions is fundamentally a social act, it is but natural to understand the social dy-
namics and the interrelations amongst the members of the Chamber. This method
may very well be generalisable in other complex routinary political processes that
involve social dynamics and multiple stakeholders. It goes without saying that
the issue of Brexit affects all of us. Our future lies in the people we elect and we
trust that they will make the right decisions that reflect our true interests. But
as Her Majesty’s Government is faced with more indecision and uncertainty, the
longer we wait to resolve this issue, the greater risk and vulnerability that it will
be harder to solve. Perhaps through our understanding of social dynamics we gain
a revealed insight into the ideologies of the people we elect and obtain a better
grasp on how they shape the future of this country.
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Supplementary material
List of Abbreviations
MP Members of Parliament, or persons elected by all those who live in a par-
ticular area (constituency) to represent them in the House of Commons.
MPs consider and propose new laws, and can scrutinise government policies
by asking ministers questions about current issues either in the Commons
Chamber or in Committees
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
EU European Union
EEC European Economic Commission
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
DUP Democratic Unionist Party
SNP Scottish National Party
Hansard
The following are the most relevant links related to the data extraction phase:
• http://explore.data.parliament.uk/?endpoint=commonsdivisions
This contains the URI code, i.e. a six-digit identifier for each division:
1109556, 1108905, etc.
• http://lda.data.parliament.uk/commonsdivisions/id/1109556.json
This is the link which I use to extract the voting (Aye / No) data for each
MP. Note that I replace the 6-digit URI code to refer to different divisions.
Network Visualization
The base framework of the force-directed algorithm that is used in this work is
taken from Jacomy et al. (2014). The attraction force Fa between two nodes a
and b is directly related to its edge, or the weighted distance w(e)× d(a,b):
Fa = w(e)× d(a,b)
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Meanwhile, the repulsion force Fd between two nodes a and b is a function
of their weighted distance, each node’s number of links (i.e. the degree) and a
parameter kr:
Fr(a,b) = kr
(deg(a) + 1)(deg(b) + 1)
w(e)× d(a,b)
where kr are user-defined settings on the gravity and scaling of the network
The other details in the network implementation are as follows. For full defi-
nitions and explanations for each parameter, refer to Jacomy et al. (2014).
• Number of threads imply more speed (more multithreading jobs). The
setting was set to 3.
• Tolerance implies the amount of swinging, and a lower number implies
more precision. The setting was 1 (default).
• Scaling is the repulsion parameter of the graph, where higher numbers show
greater sparsity. The setting was set to 2.
• Gravity attracts nodes to the center, and prevents nodes from drifting. The
setting was default (1).
• Edge weight influence was set to ”normal.” The other option was ”no
influence.”
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